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ARGUMENT 
Barrus Has Correctly Stated the Issues on Appeal 
At the start of its brief, Appellee State of Utah, Department 
of Human Services (hereinafter "the State") asserts that Barrus has 
misstated one of the issues before the court. Brief of Appellee, 
at 2. The State concludes that since Barrus admits the evidence 
does not support a finding of an express representation by the 
caseworker, then there is no further issue as to a representation 
being made. This ignores the law establishing that for estoppel 
purposes, the representation element may be established by proof 
that a person with a legal duty to speak remained silent, thereby 
causing another person to place herself in an unfavorable position 
through reliance on that silence. Utah State Building Comm. v. 
Great American Indemnity Co., 140 P.2d 763, 772 (Utah 1943). 
It is not enough to say, as the State does in its brief at 
page 16, that "[t]he court implicitly rejected arguments made by 
Barrus that Freestone had a legal duty to speak to advise Barrus 
about the impact of her lump sum DIB payment..." There is no 
indication in the memorandum decision or findings that the court 
ever considered whether the first element of estoppel was met by 
the caseworker's silence. While it is true that Barrus did not 
allege representation by silence in her complaint, she did raise 
the issue with the trial court, after Freestone denied making an 
express representation. In her trial memorandum, Barrus argued 
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that the caseworker, "made a representation, either by her direct 
statement that the lump sum would not affect Barrus' AFDC and 
Medicaid or by her silence when she knew or should have known that 
receipt of a DIB lump sum would affect Barrus' eligibility. R-125. 
That same argument was made briefly to the court in closing. R-
273-74. 
The State Caseworker Was Required by Policy To Inform Barrus of The 
Effect Receipt of A Lump Sum Would Have on Her Eligibility 
Throughout its brief, the State mischaracterizes Barrus' 
argument as being that the caseworker had a duty to advise Barrus 
how she should spend her lump sum benefit. For example: 
1. "Barrus contends that, upon the actual 
receipt of her DIB lump sum award, Freestone 
had a duty to find Barrus (before she 
foolishly spent her lump sum monies) and 
advise her to be careful about her 
expenditures. Aple. Br., at 17-18; 
2. "This letter did not create any duty ... 
to seek out Barrus to warn her to be careful 
about how she spent any such award, if and 
when it was received. Aple. Br., at 18; 
3. "[T]here is no support in case law or 
statutes for the proposition that . . . the case 
worker must do everything in his or her power 
to attempt to advise the client about spending 
the lump sum wisely." Aple. Br., at 20; 
4. "[T]he caseworker cannot compel a client 
to budget a lump sum wisely to avoid harsh 
consequences for his or her household." Aple. 
Br., at 21; and 
5. "It would not serve the public 
interest to mandate that Freestone should have 
sought out Barrus to advise her to be prudent 
in spending her money." Aple. Br., at 24. 
The State has missed the point of Barrus' argument. Her argument 
is not that the caseworker should have told Barrus how to spend her 
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DIB lump sum when it arrived; her argument is that once the 
caseworker learned that Barrus would be receiving a lump sum, state 
policy required her to inform Barrus properly as to how her 
eligibility would be affected and provide her with adequate 
information for making an informed decision. This duty is found in 
state policy which requires a caseworker to: 
1. Determine eligibility for temporary and 
appropriate benefits accurately and timely... 
2. Provide information so each client can 
make informed decisions... 
3. Determine with the client which programs 
are applicable to her circumstances... 
4. Monitor and redetermine eligibility... 
5. Use all skills, information, tools and 
resources available to assist the client. 
Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 122. Reproduced in the Addendum to Brief of 
Appellant. In its brief, the State does not even acknowledge the 
existence of these policy statements, let alone explain why the 
caseworker did not follow them. Had Freestone complied with these 
policies and provided Barrus with the correct information regarding 
the effect of a lump sum on AFDC eligibility, then Barrus could 
have made an informed decision whether to spend the lump sum as she 
did, or to put it aside to meet her family's needs during the 
three-month period of ineligibility. 
The caseworker did not need to know the amount of the DIB 
benefits Barrus would receive, nor the exact date they would be 
received, in order to provide Barrus with the critical information 
she needed. The statement that, "until a lump sum is actually 
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received by a recipient, a caseworker could only offer conjecture 
as to the impacts (if any) that sum may have on a household..." 
(Brief of Appellee, at 23) is simply incorrect. The caseworker 
admitted she could have advised Barrus that an SSI lump sum would 
not affect her children's AFDC eligibility but that DIB would. See 
Brief of Appellant, at 15. 
It is not disingenuous, as the State suggests at page 19 of 
its brief, for Barrus to argue that even as late as June 28, 1994, 
her caseworker could have advised her of the effect a DIB lump sum 
would have on her AFDC eligibility. Barrus had a telephone and 
could have been contacted, had the caseworker recognized her duty 
under State policy to inform Barrus properly. Rather than doing 
this, the caseworker sent a note asking for more information, a 
clear indication that she still did not grasp the effect her 
silence would have on Barrus' actions. 
Application of Equitable Estoppel Would Not Defeat Public Policy 
But Would Actually Promote It 
The State is correct that the lump sum policy is designed to 
encourage AFDC recipients to budget a lump sum to meet basic, 
family needs during a period of ineligibility. The State has also 
acknowledged that not every lump sum results in disqualification— 
an SSI lump sum being the best example. See Brief of the Appellee, 
at 23 ("Some lump sum payments may be countable as income and 
others will not be countable as income.") However, the policy 
underlying the lump sum provisions cannot be carried out, when a 
caseworker fails to provide important information needed by a 
4 
recipient to make a correct decision. In this case, Freestone knew 
that a DIB lump sum would result in ineligibility for Barrus, and 
that SSI would not, but chose not to inform Barrus1. Without that 
information, Barrus could not decide whether to budget for three 
months without AFDC or to spend the lump sum on important, though 
not absolutely critical, family needs. The State quotes Gardebring 
v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 431, 99 L.Ed. 2d 515, 108 S.Ct. 1306 
(1988) for the proposition that most AFDC recipients would deem it 
prudent to inform their caseworker before spending a lump sum. The 
record shows that Barrus made several attempts to inform her 
caseworker that she would be receiving a lump sum but without 
critical information from her caseworker, she could not make a 
prudent choice. The Supreme Court pointed out in Gardebring that 
the Minnesota Department of Human Services relied on its 
caseworkers "to provide applicants and recipients with oral advice 
about the aspects of the program that are relevant to specific 
situations." Id., at 424. 
Rather than acknowledge the lapse in communication, the State 
seeks to blame Barrus for not somehow finding out for herself what 
the effect of a lump sum would be on her AFDC eligibility. After 
months of silence from her caseworker, despite clear reporting of 
her eligibility for DIB benefits, Barrus was justified in 
xThe State even suggests that the caseworker had a duty not to 
inform Barrus what the effect of receiving a lump sum would be for 
her continuing AFDC eligibility. At one point, it argues that, 
"given the intent and purpose of the lump sum legislation and 
regulation (incentive to get off the welfare rolls), any imposed 
obligation to speak may well thwart that intent and purpose." Aple 
Br., at 20. 
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concluding that any lump sum she might receive would not affect her 
eligibility for AFDC. 
Finally, the State makes the conclusory argument that 
application of equitable estoppel "would result in a serious 
adverse effect on public policy and would defeat the interest of 
the government in making public assistance recipients responsible 
for their personal affairs." Brief of Appellee, at 24. The State 
fails to say what public policy would be affected by estopping the 
State from repudiating the representation it made to Barrus through 
her caseworker's silence. No authority is cited for the assertion 
that the government has an interest in "making public assistance 
recipients responsible for their personal affairs." Even if such 
an interest exists, it certainly is not advanced by refusing to 
give an AFDC recipient the information she needs to exercise 
responsibility. A better argument can be made that the public has 
an interest in seeing that everyone who deals with the government, 
whether on public assistance or not, is treated fairly. 
Application of equitable estoppel would actually promote the public 
good by forcing caseworkers to do a better job of assisting clients 
like Barrus. Such a result would increase confidence in state 
government and reduce the likelihood of cases such as this arising. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State has failed in its brief to offer convincing argument 
for not applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case. 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and a judgment 
entered declaring Barrus eligible for all benefits she received. 
DATED this X?/ ^l day of October, 1996. 
y^^^. 
^Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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